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Introduction 
 
Often, we hear claims that we face an infra-
structure “crisis” in the United States. Such warn-
ings usually arise when a dramatic failing of our 
infrastructure occurs, such as a bridge collapsing, a 
dam bursting, or medical waste washing up on our 
coastline. Lately, the buzzword has been 
“congestion” on our streets and highways, due to an 
apparently inadequate transportation network. In 
light of such concern about our infrastructure needs, 
in my recent research I have focused on the 
importance of our infrastructure for our ability to 
produce, for our growth prospects, and for our 
international competitiveness. This article sum-
marizes some of the results of this research. Spe-
cifically, I address the following three questions: 
 
+ Is there a strong and robust link be-
tween investment in our nation’s 
infrastructure and growth in produc-
tive efficiency? 
 
+ Does public nonmilitary capital ac-
cumulation lift corporate profits? 
 
+ Does public capital investment raise 
the national (private plus public) 
investment rate? 
 
 
Infrastructure and Productive Efficiency 
 
Since 1982, the United States has staged a 
truly remarkable economic performance. An 
expansion of output well into its seventh year, the 
longest in any peacetime period in American his-
tory; an addition of 21 million jobs, an average of 
3.1 million a year; a fall in the unemployment rate 
from 10.8% of the labor force to 5.1%; an inflation 
rate seemingly under control and minute in com-
parison with the double-digit rates of price increase 
that exploded during the 1970s—all are signs of a 
vital, growing economy. 
 
Still, troubling clouds have been gathering 
on the economic horizon. For instance, the rate of 
growth of total factor productivity has fallen from 
1.8% per year during the l960s to .8% in the 1970s 
and .7% in the early 1980s (1.2% in 1986). The 
reasons for the productivity slump are many and 
varied. One reason, of course, was the series of oil 
shocks beginning in late 1973; an increase in the 
price of oil renders the capital stock partially 
obsolete and less productive. Another reason was 
the cessation of the shift in the labor force from 
relatively inefficient farm occupations to relatively 
efficient urban occupations. Finally, after peaking in 
the 1960s, research and development spending 
began to fall in the 1970s, thereby diminishing the 
pace of improvement of the associated 
technological change. It should be noted, however, 
that even after taking account of all the usual 
sources of the productivity decline, a large por-
tion—roughly 1% per year—is left unexplained; 
hence the “productivity puzzle” much lamented by 
economists. 
 
Further, labor productivity growth has been 
very low in the United States relative to other 
countries in the Group of Seven; while productivity 
growth has been a dismal .6% per year in the United 
States, it has been an impressive 2.9% in West 
Germany and 3.1% in Japan. This inferior 
productivity performance is at the heart of our 
“competitiveness” problem and associated chronic 
deficits in international trade. A country in which 
the growth in production per capita slips below 
growth in consumption per person must finance the 
excess consumption either by reducing physi- 
  19 
 
cal investment (and thereby future consumption) or 
by importing the goods from overseas. To a large 
extent, the United States has followed the latter 
course, evidenced by 1987 trade deficits with 
Western Europe of $26 billion and with Japan of 
$56 billion. In the words of Harvard economist 
Robert Reich, “~o]ur nation’s growing economic 
problem.. .is due neither to the federal budget defi-
cit per se, nor to foreigner’s unwillingness to treat 
us fairly. It is due to our overwhelming failure to 
invest in our collective productivity, and the con-
sequent decline in our capacity to add value to the 
world economy.” 
 
Economists and policymakers who are con-
cerned with declining private sector productivity 
typically focus on the role of private investment in 
plant and equipment. The standard argument is that 
increases in the quantity and quality of private 
capital goods generate more output per worker. The 
potential importance of nonmilitary public capital—
a general public infrastructure—is ignored. This 
neglect is troublesome for two reasons. First, the 
nonmilitary public capital stock (combined federal, 
state and local) is sizeable, varying from between 
44% and 59% of the private nonresidential fixed 
capital stock. Hence, to ignore the influence of 
public capital on private production appears 
unjustifiable. Second, the ratio of public to private 
“productive” capital stocks peaked at end of year 
1964. While private investment spending as a share 
of gross output has declined during the last two 
decades, nonmilitary public investment spending 
has declined even more, from 3.4% of GNP during 
the 1960s to 2.0% during the early 1980s. Thus, the 
slide in public capital accumulation may be partly 
responsible for the slump in private sector 
productivity. 
 
In a series of published papers (see Refer-
ences), I have found strong and robust empirical 
evidence to substantiate the claim that a shift in 
government spending priorities away from public 
investment and into public consumption has re-
sulted in a deterioration in the flow of public 
services and consequently in an erosion of produc-
tivity growth. Indeed, the growth rate of the 
nonmilitary public capital stock is highly correlated 
with the growth rate of (total factor) productivity in 
the United States over the post-World War II 
period. My detailed statistical work indicates that a 
“core” infrastructure (streets and highways, mass 
transit, airports, water and sewer systems, and 
electrical and gas facilities) bears the strongest 
correlation with productivity. Quantitatively, as 
much as 60 percent of the productivity slump in the 
United States can be attributed to neglect of our 
core infrastructure. 
 
We would also expect that countries which 
sustain a high level of public investment relative to 
output would experience higher productivity growth 
than countries that do not invest in infrastructure. 
Confirmation is not difficult to find; Japan has 
invested about 5.1% of output in public facilities 
and achieved productivity growth of 3.1% per 
annum, while the United States has had a low public 
investment ratio of .3% and inferior productivity 
growth of .6% per year. 
 
Thus, a root cause of the decline in the 
competitive position of the United States in the 
international economy may be found in the low rate 
at which our country has chosen to add to its stock 
of highways, port facilities, airports, and other 
facilities which aid in the production and 
distribution of goods and services. In the words of 
Nancy Rutledge, past Executive Director of the 
National Council on Public Works Improvement, 
“~i]f we spend too little on public works...society 
loses more than the direct public cost. In the long 
run, our ability to compete in the international 
economy will be weakened, and our standard of 
living will suffer.” 
 
Public Infrastructure and Private Profits 
 
I hope to have shown that an adequate and 
well-maintained infrastructure is of critical impor-
tance to the process of productivity improvement. 
The public capital stock makes private labor more 
efficient and should make private capital more 
profitable. The 1950s and l960s were characterized 
by a rising share of output devoted to public 
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investment and a payoff in the form of climbing 
profits to the nonfinancial corporate sector, the 
1970s and early 1980s, on the other hand, have 
shown falling public investment shares and prof-
itability. Quantitatively, my statistical results 
suggest that a one percentage point increase in the 
nonmilitary public capital stock (16 billion dollars 
in 1985) is estimated to result in a rise in the 
corporate profit rate of 10 basis points (1/10 of one 
percentage point). Consistent with these results, in 
1985 and 1986 we have seen a modest increase in 
public investment as well as in corporate profita-
bility. 
 
Public and National Investment 
 
Public capital has been shown to be essen-
tial to private sector productivity and profitability. I 
adhere to the recommendation of the National 
Council on Public Works Improvement that the 
United States should boost its spending on infra-
structure facilities to some $90 or $100 billion a 
year. 
 
However, in an economy already operating 
at or near its capacity limits, we would need to 
know where the resources for the higher level of 
public investment would come from. Would raising 
public investment merely result in a displacement of 
private investment, so that national investment 
would be left unaffected? There are a number of 
reasons to suspect that such a “crowding out” of 
private investment spending might arise. To the 
extent that publicly provided capital serves as a 
substitute for private capital in private sector 
production, firms require less private capital to 
produce the same level of output. In addition, higher 
public sector demand in the capital goods market 
raises capital goods prices, thereby lowering the 
demand for investment goods by the private sector. 
Finally, the increased government demand creates a 
general scarcity of resources, a rise in inflation-
adjusted interest rates, and a further contraction of 
capital spending. 
 
But we have seen that a higher public 
capital stock also raises the profitability of private 
capital and, thereby, lifts stock market values. This 
improves the incentives and increases the ability of 
firms to accumulate capital, thereby “crowding in” 
private investment expenditure. New highways 
allow faster transportation of goods from factory to 
market; the availability of mass transit allows firm 
to hire good workers at reasonable wages. 
 
What, then, would have been the net effect 
on the national investment rate if we had raised the 
public investment rate during the l970s and 1980s to 
the level maintained during the 1950s and 1960s? 
Based on my statistical model, if we had maintained 
this higher level of nonmilitary public investment 
during the 1970s and 1980s, the rate of return to 
private capital would not have fallen as it actually 
did and, in 1986, would have been equal to 10.8% 
instead of its historical value of 7.7% There would 
have been no “falling rate of profit” in the United 
States for economists—let alone stockholders—to 
worry about. 
 
The immediate response of private invest-
ment would have been negative as a result of higher 
capital goods prices and interest rates, and national 
investment would be left mostly unaffected. 
However, by the end of 1974 the positive influence 
on the profitability of private capital would have 
come to dominate, and national investment would 
have been higher. By 1986, national net 
nonresidential investment would have equalled 
5.3% of the private capital stock as opposed to its 
actual value of 2.2%. Clearly, the government can 
exert a positive influence on the course of national 
investment and, in so doing, on our rate of eco-
nomic growth as well. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Large public sector deficits of recent years 
have brought attention to the overall scale of gov-
ernment activity in the economy. Some argue that 
the government should spend less, and others that it 
should tax more. Both of these responses to the 
problems posed by the federal budget deficit con-
tain merit. 
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However, the evidence presented here 
suggests that more attention should be paid to the 
composition of the government’s expenditure, 
particularly to the effects various spending patterns 
may have on the macroeconomy’s profitability and 
productivity. While total government spending 
mounts, investment in public works slides. Indeed, the 
share of total government outlays dedicated to public 
investment declined from nearly 9% in 1965 to a mere 
6% in 1985. By reorienting our public spending 
priorities so as to upgrade and expand the public 
capital stock, we can be confident we will heighten the 
productivity of our work force and improve our 
position in the increasingly competitive international 
marketplace. 
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